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EUSA Review Forum
Taking Stock of the Lisbon Agenda:
Is Lisbon Flawed, Necessary, Window-Dressing,
or All of the Above?
AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL in Lisbon in 2000 the European Union
(EU) famously declared it was going to try to become the
most competitive economy and dynamic knowledge-based
economy by the year 2010. This objective has been met with
considerable mockery in part because of the lack of a cred-
ible strategy or record of European member states prior to
2000 and in part because the immediate period that followed
by no means seemed to be heading in the right direction.
After decades of analyses and warnings of American de-
cline, even in the immediate months and year following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, investors were sending their
funds in large quantities to the US, and Europe’s new single
currency, the euro was reducing in value.
At its mid-term review, the economic situation in Europe
had stabilized a little, but there was still no sign of an obvious
clear coherent strategy or likelihood of Europe being on track
to reach its objective. If anything, talk of ‘Lisbon failure’ was
paramount. The November 2004 the Kok report suggested
that the Lisbon strategy had contradictory goals and needed
clearer governance. Of course its objectives are noble: in-
vest in education, research and development (R&D), devel-
oping the skills of citizens, improve the business climate by
cutting red-tape, seeking to increase employment by provid-
ing apprenticeships for recent graduates, increasing childcare
facilities, and achieving these objectives in an environment of
sustainability (including exploiting more sustainable energy
sources). Following the 2005 reform of the Lisbon Agenda,
the second half of this decade will be a serious testing period
for the EU, in that it needs to determine how important the
Lisbon Agenda’s objectives really are. Is it merely a public
relations exercise (i.e. does it have as aim to tell European
citizens that the ultimate aim of the EU is to try to boost
competitiveness and growth)? Or is it seeking to find ways to
remove rigidities in the market place and tackle relatively
low labor participation in Europe? Or perhaps the aim is to
find a European solution to the increasing pressures from
‘globalization’ that seem to keep threatening to undermine
Europe’s social model without providing some of the benefits
of it in return (such as more jobs and higher growth)?
This forum asked five contributors to reflect on these
various dimensions of the Lisbon Agenda and make and as-
sessment of where we are at. Groenendijk offers a general
overview of the Lisbon Agenda and argues that its objectives
are crucial but its tools to achieve them are flawed. Bongardt
and Torres explain the role of the single market and compe-
tition policy in trying to reach the Lisbon objectives and what
are some of the positive effects of having sought to achieve
them. Schelkle takes the developments in Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) (in particular the fiscal regime elabo-
rated upon through the Stability and Growth Pact) into ac-
count and examines if Lisbon and EMU are compatible.
Pochet also examines the EMU regime, but from a broader
perspective. He offers an analysis of the various alliances
and groups in support of various visions of European integra-
tion and examines how Lisbon and the OMC might seek to
promote competitiveness and growth without destroying
Europe’s social model. Finally, the contribution by Smith looks
at the competitiveness objective is embedded in the commit-
tee structure of the European Parliament. Taking the case of
REACH, a new regulation for the chemicals sector, he dis-
cusses how it affects lobbying and policy networks. In con-
clusion, returning to the question set out in the title, it seems
to me that the contributors of this forum conclude that Lisbon
is ‘all of the above’: flawed, necessary, window-dressing and
more…
-Amy Verdun, University of Victoria,
EUSA Forum Editor
The Revised Lisbon Agenda: Flawed but not yet
Failed
Nico Groenendijk
THE LISBON AGENDA, put forward in 2000, has now been in
place for six years. The failure of the initial overly ambitious
policy agenda (‘becoming the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustain-
able growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion, in 2010’) is unmistakable. Defeat has – implicitly –
been acknowledged in the 2004 review (by the High Level
Group chaired by Wim Kok) and in the 2005 mid-term re-
form by the Commission.
The initial agenda suffered from an overload of policy
objectives: 28 in total, rendered into 120 sub-objectives and
117 policy indicators. Problems of incompatibility of these
objectives were neglected and the implementation by mem-
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ber states was inadequate due to a lack of political will. Giv-
ing this false start the go-by, the question now is how to as-
sess the merits and demerits of the current revised agenda
with its focus on growth and jobs.
Central to the current Lisbon policy framework is eco-
nomic welfare in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
per capita (pc). On that criterion the EU performs poorly
compared to the US. Labor input is low showing itself in high
unemployment rates, low participation rates, and low num-
bers of hours worked. Hourly labor productivity growth (well
above the US level some decades ago) has also slowed down
considerably. In Europe relatively few people put in relatively
few hours during which relatively little economic value is cre-
ated.
One could argue that GDP pc does not fully capture
welfare, as it disregards environmental and social impacts,
and ignores equity issues (for example, how is welfare dis-
tributed?). Furthermore, comparing productivity between dif-
ferent regions in the global economy is rather tricky, as low
productivity performance could well be the result of explicit
collective choices regarding the upbringing of children, re-
tirement age, possibilities to enjoy holidays, et cetera, which
have a direct effect on labor input.
In essence, the Lisbon Agenda is about conjoining eco-
nomic restructuring (necessary due to globalization) and the
‘European way of life’, about gearing (labor) productivity
issues to choices made in the social domain, within a stable
macroeconomic framework. Obviously this raises questions
of compatibility. First, there is the issue of compatibility of
structural (labor market) reforms and macroeconomic con-
solidation, addressed in more detail in this Review Forum by
Waltraud Schelkle. Is such consolidation, especially fiscal stin-
giness, enabling or detrimental to structural reforms? Sec-
ond, there are problems of gearing economic restructuring to
(the renewal of) social policies (see also the contribution by
Philippe Pochet). ‘Gearing to’ sometimes is a matter of trade-
off between policy goals (like with relaxing severance regu-
lations) but often productivity growth and social policy objec-
tives go hand in hand (like with fighting youth unemployment).
The current Lisbon Agenda thus is an inherently com-
plex one in terms of objectives, which can be mutually rein-
forcing or conflicting. Its success or failure cannot readily be
assessed by looking at GDP pc only. The fourteen structural
Lisbon indicators agreed upon as part of the 2005 reform by
the Council and the Commission rightfully include macroeco-
nomic variables, employment indicators, indicators on inno-
vation and research, on economic reform, on social cohesion,
and on the environment.
Still, singling out fourteen heterogeneous indicators is dif-
ferent from adequately dealing with links between various
policy fields. Unfortunately, the Lisbon Strategy itself does
not seem to grasp fully this point. Even after the 2005 re-
form, it is simply not subtle enough in its policy objectives and
methods. Various policy goals are lumped together in an overall
strategy that uses a single mode of governance (the open
method of coordination (OMC)), aimed uniformly at all
twenty-five member states. Such a strategy is highly flawed
and what is needed is more diverse and sophisticated gover-
nance, both in terms of policy theory and policy implementa-
tion.
The Barcelona target, which is part of the Lisbon Agenda,
can be used to illustrate this argument. This target refers to
Guideline 12 (‘To increase and facilitate investment in Re-
search and Development (R&D)’) of the 23 Integrated Guide-
lines for growth and jobs and contains a clear mark: three per
cent of GDP should be spent on R&D, of which two per-
centage points should be private R&D expenditure. This EU-
wide target serves as a reference value at the domestic level
and is implemented through the OMC, as part of which mem-
ber states write biennial National Action Plans which are
then peer-reviewed. Not surprisingly, the Barcelona target is
increasingly reproduced within member states on the regional
level (by similar systems of open coordination, using Regional
Action Plans). However, of the 254 regions in the EU only
21 reach the three per cent target (2002 figures); of the 25
member states only Finland (3.5%) and Sweden (3.7%) qualify
(2004 figures).
The Barcelona target suffers from being based on a rather
traditional, mechanical and largely outdated view of innova-
tion. Innovation does not only depend on R&D expenditure
but also on member states’ and regions’ organizational and
social capacities. The Lisbon Agenda largely assumes growth
is technology driven, which may have been an adequate view
in from the 1950s through the 1980s, but which does not hold
anymore. Technological innovation is important, but it is not
the prime driver of growth. (Productivity) growth is influ-
enced by other factors than innovation. Often these factors
are of more importance than innovation as such. Such (‘hard’)
factors comprise taxation, (labor market) regulation, work-
ers’ skills, and (intercontinental) accessibility of regions. Of
course, such factors are partly addressed within the Lisbon
Strategy by other guidelines. But it raises the question, where
to raise or spend our money? Should we lower taxes, stimu-
late entrepreneurship, invest in education or in R&D? The
Lisbon Agenda tells us to do it all at once.
Moreover, setting a reference value for all 25 member
states ignores the investment character of R&D expenditure
and the existence of geographical patterns of economic ac-
tivity within the EU. Investments should be made where they
give the highest return and not simply across-the-board. Also,
the Barcelona target does not really deal with the possibility
of crowding-out between public and private R&D invest-
ment or with the fact that private R&D expenditure gener-
ally has a higher impact on growth than public R&D expen-
diture. In short, the Barcelona target is too simple and out of
touch with the more complex economic reality. Our general
understanding of that reality is insufficiently incorporated into
the Lisbon policies.
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As far as policy implementation is concerned, the Lisbon
Agenda leans heavily on the OMC, the advantages and dis-
advantages of which have been discussed extensively over
the last years. The OMC’s main advantage, namely its ability
to deal with diversity within the European Union, does not
really show in its use within the Lisbon Strategy, given the
emphasis within this strategy on uniformly applicable refer-
ence values. Its main disadvantage, lack of enforceability,
clearly presents a problem if EU wide objectives (like mini-
mum labor participation rates or fiscal deficit ceilings) are to
be reached. The same goes for highly important policy ob-
jectives like the establishment of a European Research Area
or the introduction of EU wide patent law. Such objectives
call for old-fashioned directives and/or an increase in the EU
budget, rather than soft coordination.
In summary, one could argue that although the Lisbon
Agenda was originally stated as a naively opportunistic set of
goals, the revised Lisbon Agenda has remedied some of its
flaws but definitely not all.
Nico Groenendijk is Jean Monnet Professor of Euro-
pean Economic Governance, Centre for European
Studies, University of Twente, the Netherlands.
Is Lisbon not Delivering?
Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION and in particular the single
European market often appear to be only the smallest com-
mon denominator but have been instrumental in putting in
motion governance patterns in the European Union (EU).
The Lisbon Agenda that outlines an economic and social strat-
egy meant to relaunch the EU within a changed setting is a
case in point.
Lisbon Agenda: Objectives, Means and Implementa-
tion
In Lisbon in March 2000 the European Council set the
strategic goal of turning the EU into the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010,
with sustained economic growth with more and better em-
ployment, greater social cohesion and sustainable develop-
ment. The Lisbon strategy featured broad objectives and rami-
fications and coincided with a new governance method, the
open method of coordination (OMC). It was drawn up against
the background of a productivity slowdown in Europe that
contrasted with a productivity revival in the United States
from the mid-1990s onwards, attributed to the new economy,
and within a context of globalization and liberalization.
The European Council had held that an average eco-
nomic growth rate of three per cent of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) was possible, provided that a variety of measures
were taken that would – directly or indirectly – facilitate the
shift towards an information society (such as to promote
Research and Development (R&D) and the creation of small
and medium-sized enterprises, complete the internal market,
modernize the European social model, ensure a sound mac-
roeconomic setting).
Within this context the completion of the single European
market is key. The Lisbon strategy represents a European
industrial policy, not of the interventionist type (choosing win-
ners) but one that creates generally favorable conditions for
competition, ensures a level playing field for economic agents
(hence the importance of competition policy) and remedy
market failure. The Lisbon strategy goes however much be-
yond that. Given common goals and the reality of European
mixed economies, it hinges on complementary and coordi-
nated policies in many domains that involve not only the EU
but also the Member State level.
Successive European Councils have sought to improve
the Lisbon strategy by formulating deliverables. Yet, half way
into the decade the failure to reach the targets was obvious.
The Kok report (Kok 2004) attributed the lack of success to
both EU and Member State failure to implement the Lisbon
strategy. More specifically, it pointed to the fact that Lisbon
had too broad an agenda and was suffering from shortcom-
ings in the governance structure. The 2005 mid-term review
led to sharpening the Lisbon objectives to focusing more nar-
rowly on employment and growth. Furthermore it suggested
the need for changes in governance in particular to ensure
the coordination of national reform programs (NRP) (the
NRPs are Member States’ responsibility).
Liberalization and Institutional Reform
The twin-challenge posed by the new economy (charac-
terized by the importance attributed to knowledge and to in-
formation and communications technologies that raise the
productivity of third sectors) and liberalization and globaliza-
tion not only calls into question firms’ competitiveness, but
also whether institutions and governance patterns in the EU
are adequate for realizing the benefits from a knowledge-
based and globalized economy and produce growth. The need
to encourage innovation and take economic advantage of glo-
balization and of a fast-changing technological and market
environment requires functioning markets but also an institu-
tional framework conducive to innovation and change. The
implementation of the Lisbon common goals in the reality of
European mixed economies implies that institutions (broadly
defined) and a variety of policies need to be coordinated with
a view to synergies and complementarities and to policy learn-
ing.
While the European single market is a reality (and mostly
in the EU domain), although progress in some areas has been
slower (in particular in services), it has been a major chal-
lenge to adapt national institutions and policies created in a
very different economic and technological environment. While
society as a whole stands to benefit from gains from trade
and liberalization that contribute to higher living standards,
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within society there are winners and losers. Whether and
how those latter ones are to be compensated will not only be
important for the political acceptability of reforms (issues of
equity and distribution), but also raises the question of
sustainability and of the efficiency (providing adequate in-
centives) of social systems; adequately designed social poli-
cies can be efficiency-enhancing. The 2005 Lisbon mid-term
review’s innovation in terms of governance consists in the
introduction of NRPs, to be coordinated by the Integrated
Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-8) adopted by the
Council (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2006). It is the main instru-
ment to achieve coherence. To the extent that it succeeds in
increasing stakeholder involvement, or ownership in gover-
nance, it might mitigate conflicts and thus foster the imple-
mentation of national reforms with a view to the Lisbon goals.
This would be important since liberalization (within the
internal market and with respect to the rest of the world) and
benefits from trade have contributed to high present Euro-
pean living standards and are at the heart of European eco-
nomic and political integration but also because Europe needs
to adapt itself as to take advantage of globalization and con-
front future challenges. Unsatisfactory economic performance
and/or an inadequate (or perceived as such) social system
imply political risks, to the extent that public opinion might
turn against internal and external liberalization on the Euro-
pean single market and in the World Trade Organization, re-
spectively, and resist necessary structural and institutional
change or enlargement in the name of some ‘European model’,
and eventually threaten the EU political integration project
itself. The Bolkestein services directive, and its role in the
rejection of the EU constitution in the Netherlands and in
France, is a case in point.
Governance of the Lisbon Process: OMC and Beyond
Policies that are vital for the implementation of the Lisbon
goals involve not only various governance levels but as well
different coordination modes. The Lisbon strategy is often
identified with soft coordination through the open method of
coordination (OMC). The OMC’s weak point reportedly is
its reliance on benchmarking (that is, peer pressure and pub-
lic opinion) in the absence of formal sanctions. Reforms re-
quire commitment beside functioning markets. The fact that
the OMC seems not to have worked as a commitment de-
vice for the Lisbon strategy contrasts with Economic and
Monetary Union where there was a timetable and there were
conditions that had to be met by Member States. It is inter-
esting to note that the institution of NRPs in the refocused
Lisbon strategy aims to involve stakeholders and thus increase
commitment.
The Kok report had advocated improving the governance
of the Lisbon strategy by a tripartite approach, namely NRPs
coordinated by EU guidelines, an EU budget with adequate
resources and priorities with respect to the Lisbon objec-
tives, and benchmarking as a coercion mechanism for poor
performers. In the event, the governance system of the re-
formed Lisbon strategy came to rely on  NRPs, with EU
budget reform postponed and benchmarking through com-
parative performance indicators watered down.
It remains to be seen to what extent NRPs will trigger a
national debate in poorly performing countries and whether
national ownership proves sufficient to overcome national
resistance to reforms with an EU rationale and increase com-
mitment as to successfully implement reform programs. De-
spite possible governance weaknesses, it might be important,
however, to not lose sight of the fact that the very discussions
prompted by and facilitated within the context of the  Lisbon
Agenda have meant that Lisbon has in practice moved on
beyond OMC and makes use of a range of instruments. Gov-
ernance levels and modes in the EU are moreover not static
but in flux as a function of internal market developments (see
Bongardt 2006, on the case of competition policy). The Lisbon
process has not only made shortcomings more visible and led
to more similar preferences and possibly circumstances, but
issues have been pulled to a European level (e.g. Bologna
process) and institutions were created, it has resulted in the
application of the normal legislative process (EU directives
that are the result of discussions within the Lisbon strategy),
or in EU regulations.
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Structural Reform and Fiscal Consolidation: How
Compatible are the Lisbon and  Maastricht Agendas?
Waltraud Schelkle
THE LISBON STRATEGY SUPPORTS an overhaul of existing welfare
state arrangements in the European Union (EU) so as to fur-
ther the goal of making the European economy a ‘most com-
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petitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy’, including
more and better jobs and social cohesion. At the same time,
the fiscal philosophy of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
endorses ‘rule-based’ as opposed to discretionary macroeco-
nomic stabilization (Buti et al. 2003: 28). Governments should
allow only the automatic or ‘in-built’ stabilizers to do the
smoothing of aggregate income while coordination must care
for the long-term sustainability of public finances by forcing
governments to play by the rules of ‘close to balance or in
surplus’ over the cycle and no more than three per cent defi-
cit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), except in severe re-
cessions. But how compatible are these two agendas of eco-
nomic governance in the EU: the Lisbon and the Maastricht
agendas?
There has been a considerable amount of research on
the impact of fiscal consolidation on structural reforms (for a
succinct review see IMF 2004: 113-116). One strand in the
literature maintains that the hardening of governments’ bud-
get constraints will provide a political environment which fa-
cilitates structural reforms. This reform strategy of ‘back
against the wall’ or TINA (‘there is no alternative’) is based
on the idea that fiscal crises or permanent austerity raise
awareness of the (unsustainable) costs of the status quo and
thus weaken the opposition to reform. Another strand, by
contrast, sees tensions, suggesting that fiscal space is re-
quired so as to allow compensation of potential or actual los-
ers from reforms; a strategy that is based on the ‘need for
bribes’ or political exchanges. A rise in the budget deficit
may be necessary in the beginning not only to buy off oppo-
sition from the beneficiaries of the status quo, but also in
order to bear the upfront costs of reforms.
Comparative research on reform processes in thirty coun-
tries that are member of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has established three
findings that speak to these competing hypotheses. First, re-
forms seem to be easier and more likely in good times or an
expansionary phase of the business cycle. Second, EU mem-
bership is a positive predictor of reform activism, although
more for the slashing of non-employment benefits than for
deregulation of employment protection. Third, after the start
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the EU in 1999,
the reform activism of euro area members has become
weaker compared to the non-EMU members in the union,
although it was still higher than for other OECD countries.
These findings can be read as evidence for ‘political ex-
changes in the shadow of fiscal austerity’. Political exchanges
are easier when there is actually the prospect of rewards
despite temporary hardships, be it in the form of job growth
or membership in EMU. Reform fatigue sets in rather quickly
in bad times and has been evident since EMU was estab-
lished. The shadow of fiscal austerity is noticeable in the
pattern of reform that privileges measures that promise some
relief for public finances, while shifting costs to firms (better
employment protection for existing employees) and to those
who must accept lower non-employment benefits or non-
standard contracts (less employment protection for part-tim-
ers and temporary workers). The shadow of fiscal austerity
may thus contribute to the (re-)creation of insider-outsider
labor markets that the Lisbon Agenda set out to reform.
The revision of the Stability and Growth Pact in spring
2005 can be seen as reflecting policy-makers’ awareness of
the limitations of austerity as a reform lever. The Pact now
allows for a postponement of the Excessive Deficit Proce-
dure if governments can show that an excessive deficit has
been caused by temporary costs of reforms and will lead to
fiscal savings over the medium to long run. Pension reforms
which accumulate funds and lower the entitlements under
pay-as-you-go systems are explicitly mentioned. Thus, the
revision of the fiscal rules can be read as admitting that a
‘back against the wall’ strategy could not be sustained indefi-
nitely.
Does this mean that the two Agendas have become com-
patible, now that the Pact has been revised? The answer is
‘not necessarily’ since structural reforms may impair the sta-
bilizing capacity of member states’ tax-transfer systems. Not
much research has been done on this question, yet some in-
sights can be gained from the economic literature on auto-
matic stabilizers (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000, van den
Noord 2000). Why might there be tensions between the thrust
of the Lisbon Agenda and the fiscal philosophy of EMU? To
give an example, the mantra of every statement on the Euro-
pean reform and social policy agenda is that incentives for
creating and maintaining employment need adjustment. This
translates into an explicit call for lower marginal and average
tax rates. By contrast, old and new research in public fi-
nance tell us that automatic stabilizers are more likely to be
effective if government is ‘big’ and thus the average tax rates
high, or if the tax system is progressive which makes for high
marginal tax rates (van den Noord 2000: 7). Thus, there seems
to be a tension between the ever popular call for lowering tax
rates and the requirements of effective stabilization in the
EU.
The Lisbon Agenda also contains elements that may ac-
tually strengthen the stabilizers built into the tax and transfer
systems. Reforms that would shift social expenditure from
what have become permanent and open-ended transfers, such
as those for long-term unemployment or early retirement, to
temporary transfers, for instance to subsidies for entry wages
and training, would go some way to restore the cyclical sen-
sitivity of the benefit system. This responsiveness on the ex-
penditure side of budgets has largely gone missing in most
member states (van den Noord 2000: 19). Obviously, the ex-
tent of complementarity between welfare reform and fiscal
policy coordination is of much interest since that would allow
exploiting synergies between the two processes.
The evidence again suggests that the EU’s dual agenda
could be problematic. Mabbett and Schelkle (forthcoming)
used EUROMOD, a tax-benefit simulation model based on
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micro-data on individual households for EU-15 member states
(Sutherland 2001), to estimate how tax reforms would affect
the strength of automatic stabilizers. Unsurprisingly, lower-
ing the level and the progressivity of income taxation, in or-
der to improve labor supply incentives, weakens the effec-
tiveness of fiscal stabilization in EMU. Moreover, shrinking
the tax state weakens it more than making tax rates less
progressive. While EUROMOD allowed us to look at tax
changes only, these findings are unlikely to be challenged by
taking the benefit side into account: benefits that vary with
the business cycle, for instance unemployment benefits, are
simply too small to overcompensate the effect on the rev-
enue side of the budget.
In sum, research suggests that the Lisbon Agenda of
structural reform must be seen in its interaction with the
Maastricht Agenda of fiscal consolidation. This is because
its own effectiveness may be impaired by the simultaneous
attempt to make public finances sustainable. In turn, the ef-
fectiveness of automatic stabilizers which are supposed to
do all the macroeconomic smoothing in member states may
be weakened by Lisbon-type reforms. These findings call
for more conscious efforts to take the political dynamics and
the aggregate consequences of reform processes into ac-
count, especially now that the revised Pact allows to priori-
tize reforms.
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Lisbon and the Open Method of Coordination:
Political Alliances and an Unclear Future
Philippe Pochet
LISBON IS OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH the Open Method of Coordi-
nation (OMC) and the emerging new modes of governance
linked to it. Attention has focused on the (potential) effects
of such a soft method, raising research questions, such as
does Lisbon mark a turn toward a renewal of the EU social
dimension, and, how does OMC affect the domestic politics
in the member states? I would like to propose another in-
terpretation of Lisbon and the underlying dynamics behind
economic and social recent developments. My starting point
is Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the institu-
tional changes it implies for social policies.
In understanding Lisbon, varieties of capitalism, political
economy, new institutionalist, and party-political approaches
could offer useful perspectives when analyzing European
developments.
Since the Maastricht treaty, different actors have sup-
ported different economic and social strategies with a view
to (re-)discovering a European growth path. Each group pos-
sesses its own underlying economic (and social) vision, which
lends overall coherence to its actions in the economic and
social field.  The main level for change could be national or
European. Below, I describe very briefly their main focus
distinguishing between two groups (economist versus social)
and each of them having two variants.
Mainstream economists and central banks are the domi-
nant group. Mainstream economists have as their key argu-
ment is that in case of asymmetric shocks adjustments must
be made through labor markets (flexible employment con-
tracts, but also flexible wages). The labor market must be-
come a true market and collective functions must be con-
fined to cases of market failure. In addition, social security –
often regarded as a burden by this group - should be scaled
down. Deregulation should take place at the national level.
The main task of the EU is to remove obstacles to the mar-
kets in goods, capital, services and persons.
On many points, the second group, composed of propo-
nents of endogenous growth theory is not fundamentally dis-
tinct from the first. But those who are in this group believe in
bolstering the growth rate by investing in research, education
and lifelong learning. Unlike the mainstream economists, they
are not backed by any particular social group. Their impor-
tance derives mainly from the position they hold within the
Commission. At the national level, budgets must be redirected
towards growth-producing areas; so must the European bud-
get.
Group 3 (which I will label ‘Delors’ followers’) is not
guided by an economic ‘corpus that is clearly identifiable.
Delors’ followers accept globalization and EMU, but want
their adverse social effects to be tempered. Lifelong learning
and education are the appropriate responses to globalization.
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They focus on the issues of poverty and social exclusion (new
social risks). Political union is central both for regulating glo-
balization and creating an EU social dimension.  Well-bal-
anced reforms should be carried out at national level.
The last group – traditional neo-keynesian left – stresses
the importance of macro-economic policies for growth and
employment. The neo-keynesians want EMU to be altered
because, unlike the previous groups, they believe that mon-
etary policy is always effective in reducing unemployment.
The Maastricht criteria must therefore be modified and ECB
must back the goal of full employment. At European level,
the aim is to ensure greater economic policy coordination
(European economic government).
Let’s examine rapidly the sequences of events and the
dynamic between the different groups (for a full account see
Pochet 2005).
The inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of the goals of
Economic and Monetary Union and its convergence criteria
marked a victory for those who advocated deepening the
economic dimension, as opposed to the social and political
dimension, of European integration (group 1 and 2). But the
game is dynamic and the reaction of the social groups was to
try to complement EMU. It was a period of intense institu-
tional creativity at EU and national level: creation of the Eu-
ropean Employment Strategy (EES), the employment com-
mittee, the Stability and Growth Pact, creation of the sectoral
social dialogue committees, macro-economic dialogue, OMC,
national social pacts, et cetera
The Lisbon European Council of 2000 was a turning point
as it tried to elaborate a first synthesis of the various devel-
opments. It took place in a context in which social-democrat
governments had a clear majority in national governments
member states. Alliances were shifting. Group 2 was dis-
tancing itself from mainstream economists and aligning itself
with group 3. Their alliance was on the substance: invest-
ment in a knowledge-based society was the concern shared
by both strands. According to Rodrigues who was a key player
(2002: 14) ‘Its (Lisbon strategy) central idea is to recognize
that, in order to sustain the European social model, we need
to renew it well as well as to renew its economic basis by
focusing on knowledge and innovation. This should be the
main purpose of an agenda for structural reforms.’ This con-
trasts with the competitiveness credo of the mainstream
economist group.
The OMC was the procedural brainchild of group 3 in an
attempt to achieve European social convergence. The com-
promise between groups 2 and 3 related also to levels of
action, since the OMC contained both national reform pro-
grams (priority of group 2) and a means of creating a social
Europe (priority of group 3).
The first steps to create European social convergence
were to adopt joint European indicators (at one point there
were almost 150 for the EES) and by standardizing the na-
tional data contained in the various national action plans.
National social institutions were not directly challenged (no
support for a single model) but it was anticipated that they
should be able to improve their performance (by learning).
This alliance between groups 2 and 3, around the knowl-
edge-based society, deepened the divide between the two
social groups. From the outset, group 4 saw the OMC to be
inappropriate and inefficient (a view shared by the main-
stream economists). This divide between 2 and 3, on the one
hand, and 1 , on the other, was accentuated later by different
opinions on the draft constitution.
This consensus lasted for just over two years. In 2002,
the Barcelona European Council signaled the end of the pre-
dominance of social-democrat governments and the start of
a new liberal ideological offensive (new synthesis) which
waged fights on three fields (hierarchy between social and
economy, level of action, content).
First, the new hierarchy took the shape of grouping to-
gether the various processes, with a view to simplifying
(‘streamlining’) them but the result was to subordinate the
European Employment Strategy to economic objectives (there
are now two guidelines on wage moderation). EES is no longer
an (parallel) experimental exercise but should be seen as form-
ing part of the main economic objectives.
The second involved abandoning European aspirations
and falling back on national reforms, with group 2 insisting
now that social affairs must be handled at national level (see
Sapir reports, 2003, 2005). All the instruments supporting the
emergence of an EU dimension were challenged (less indi-
cators, less standardized reports, more flexibility in the na-
tional priorities et cetera).
The third consisted of addressing issues in terms of com-
petitiveness – no longer in terms of a society based on knowl-
edge and innovation. This part was not completely success-
ful as social actors mobilized and succeeded to keep social
protection OMC alive even if more marginalized than be-
fore.
What’s next?
If Lisbon and the OMCs are in a bad shape, what is left?
My answer is that the key question should be, how to rear-
range social and economic institutions at national and Euro-
pean levels in order to secure growth in the Eurozone. In my
view it would be a mistake to take a functional view at an-
swering this question (that is, to believe that in the end the
social will adapt to the requirements of the new monetary
regime) as the actual deregulatory political agenda seems to
suggest. In fact, as we have learned from the Varieties of
Capital and neo-institutionalist literatures, a radical neo-lib-
eral institutional turn does not happen in more or less coordi-
nated economy. Lisbon and the OMCs were experimental
tools (long term commitment, soft law approach, learning,
diversity, participation et cetera) which sought to deal with
the creation of institutions and change at EU and national
level. What may be the appropriate tools that will be able to
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combine diversity and economic performance is still to be
discovered. We still have a long way to go to finding appro-
priate strategies to rearrange national and European social
and economic institutions so as to secure growth. But it should
be a high priority to come up with creative proactive ideas
and strategies.
Philippe Pochet is Director of the European Social
Observatory, Brussels, and Adjunct Professor, Griffith
University, Australia.
Lisbon Lives: Institutional Embedding of the
Competitiveness Objective
Mitchell P. Smith
for approximately five years following its inception, scholars
viewed the Lisbon process as a relatively empty rhetorical
exercise, doomed by the coupling of deep ambiguities in the
framing of the Lisbon Agenda with the excessive ambition of
its stated goals. But the Lisbon process recently has come to
life. While debates continue in Europe over the most produc-
tive means to achieve competitiveness, Lisbon has become
infused with meaning because a dominant conception of com-
petitiveness has become embedded in EU institutions. Fo-
cusing on the embedding of the competitiveness objective in
the committee structure of the European Parliament, this
contribution to the Forum illustrates the argument with refer-
ence to the trajectory of REACH (registration, evaluation,
and authorization of chemicals), a new regulation for the
chemicals sector that has been the most intensively lobbied
piece of legislation in EU history.
The initial language of Lisbon reflected the inherent am-
biguities of the competitiveness concept. The Lisbon Agenda
posited that augmented dynamism of European industry and
enhanced protection of the environment are interrelated com-
ponents of future competitiveness. At least by implication,
industrial competitiveness could be driven by environmen-
tally-friendly innovation, in addition to intensified investment
in research and development and liberalization of markets.
This produced a highly contested discourse, in which a wide
range of actors, including environmental interest associations,
sought to invoke Lisbon to advance their preferences. But
during the past two years, a dominant framing of Lisbon has
emerged, in which competitiveness is defined by minimiza-
tion of the regulatory burden on industry.
The debate following the November 2004 Kok Report
marked the turning point in the substantiation of Lisbon. The
high-level group authoring the report underscored the need
to lend the Lisbon Agenda clear meaning, noting that, at mid-
term, the Lisbon process ‘is about everything and thus about
nothing.’1  The Kok report hardly settled the ambiguities of
Lisbon, but while it acknowledged that environmental tech-
nologies can boost competitiveness and create first-mover
advantages for European industry, it decisively gave primacy
to competitiveness and job creation over environmental pro-
tection. As suggested by an all-party environment group for
the British Parliament, according to the Kok Report, ‘growth
and employment are preconditions for social and environ-
mental protection.’2
Most critical to establishing the dominance of this par-
ticular conceptualization, emphasis on the regulatory burden
as the essence of competitiveness has gained footing through
the Competitiveness Council, Directorate-General (DG) En-
terprise, and the European Parliament’s Internal Market and
Consumer Affairs (IMCO) and Industry, Research and En-
ergy (ITRE) committees. Institutional embedding of this con-
ception of competitiveness has in turn privileged organized
interests with well-developed channels of access to each of
these institutional nodes. For example, European industry fed-
erations in 2004 formed the Alliance for a Competitive Euro-
pean Industry (ACEI), an effort to define the Lisbon concept
by establishing a uniform, routinized impact assessment pro-
cess. Intensifying pressure on the European Commission to
embrace impact assessment procedures more sympathetic
to the regulatory costs imposed on business, ACEI called
specifically for an external impact assessment process inde-
pendent from the Commission and reporting to the Council
and the Parliament, on the grounds that the existing process
lacked transparency, independence, and quality control.3
Reflecting the ascendance of DG Enterprise within the
Commission, in its statement of strategic objectives for 2005-
2009, the Commission emphasized the critical role of impact
assessment as an integral component of its quest for ‘better
regulation’ a reduced regulatory burden on business, and a
reinvigorated Lisbon Agenda. Moreover, while the Commis-
sion has responded to pressures from industry with a sus-
tained focus on developing methods for quantifying adminis-
trative burdens, the Commission has not granted comparable
attention to measuring environmental and health benefits.
Within the European Parliament, the intersection of height-
ened competitiveness concerns with proposals to regulate on
behalf of diffuse interests such as human health and the en-
vironment has drawn in more actors to debates over such
regulation. This includes intensified industry lobbying, more
extensive EP dialogue with the Council from the first reading
of proposed legislation, and the active involvement of addi-
tional EP committees. Foremost among these is the new
Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs
(IMCO), which in several recent instances has claimed shared
competence with the Environment Committee (ENVI) over
regulations having both environmental and competitiveness
implications. The involvement of these actors has multiplied
and diversified information resources, reducing exclusive re-
liance upon and deference to the Environment Committee,
rendering ENVI reports less likely to carry convincing ma-
jorities in plenary without concessions to the competitiveness
concerns of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
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outside ENVI.
This is illustrated clearly by the recent case of REACH,
a new regulation for the chemicals sector. Asserting that the
REACH regulation is about industrial policy, as much as en-
vironmental policy, the Internal Market Committee (IMCO)4
contested exclusive ENVI responsibility for REACH. In re-
sponse, the Parliament’s Conference of Presidents invoked
the EP’s enhanced Hughes procedure, taking the unusual
step of granting both the Internal Market as well as the In-
dustry, Research, and Energy (ITRE) committees enhanced
status. The additional authority extended to IMCO and ITRE
ultimately made it necessary for ENVI to hew closer to the
industry position in order to obtain a majority in plenary.  Much
of this followed from the bifurcation of lobbying that ensued;
rather than having to work through ENVI, the chemicals in-
dustry federation (CEFIC) was able to focus its activities on
MEPs with whom it already had established relationships. In
other words, the ability of the Internal Market and Industry
Committees to claim shared jurisdiction over chemicals sec-
tor regulation represented a favorable shift in the political
opportunity structure for chemical industry interests.
Environmental NGOs found their network links with
Environment Committee MEPs substantially neutralized by
ENVI’s need to compromise with IMCO and ITRE. Envi-
ronmental interest associations did not possess the resources
to build anew relations with members of other committees.
Moreover, environmentalists encountered a critical asymme-
try: while industry federations CEFIC and UNICE enjoyed
access to IMCO and ENVI alike, IMCO members expected
environmental interests to articulate their arguments predomi-
nantly through ENVI.
Furthermore, when institutional actors like the Competi-
tiveness Council and concentrated interests such as national
chemicals sector industry federations frame debates over
environmental issues in terms of competitiveness, environ-
mentalists can not readily pose an effective alternative frame.
Competitiveness framing typically acknowledges the impor-
tance of environmental protection, but subsumes the envi-
ronmental frame by positing that a robust business environ-
ment is a precondition for investments in production processes
that can improve environmental quality. In general, while
members of plenary may defer to ENVI members on tech-
nical environmental issues, they do not make the same con-
cessions on questions of economic impact of environmental
measures. This increases the likelihood that ENVI will have
to amend its positions in accordance with the wishes of MEPs
from other committees in order to gain substantial majorities
in plenary.
As the competitiveness frame becomes more deeply
embedded as the compass for EU policy making, institutions
like the European Parliament’s IMCO and ITRE gain addi-
tional leverage to claim shared competence over proposed
legislation, to legitimate the need for close attention to com-
petitiveness concerns, and even to induce ENVI to recast its
positions on environmental legislation in anticipation of resis-
tance within the EP. This dynamic is not limited to the case of
REACH, and has been displayed, for example, in the recent
debate over proposed regulation to restrict nutrition claims on
food labels. In this case, too, the Environment Committee
was highly constrained by competitiveness discourse and the
influence of IMCO in its ability to act as a determined advo-
cate for health interests. In a broader sense, institutional em-
bedding of competitiveness in the EP is a hallmark of a shift
in the logic of internal EP politics from a cooperative game to
advance the collective interests of the institution (including
deeper European integration and institutional aggrandizement),
to a competitive logic in which parties and committees com-
pete to harness the institution’s influence to advance their
policy visions.
The institutional embedding of a dominant definition of
competitiveness by no means implies that the EU will achieve
the Lisbon objectives. However, institutionalization of a com-
mitment to minimize the regulatory burden on industry does
restructure the political opportunities presented to concen-
trated and diffuse interests by EU policy making.
Mitchell P. Smith is Associate Professor of Comparative
Politics in Political Science and the School of Interna-
tional and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma.
He is also Co-Director of OU’s European Union Center.
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